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Abstract
Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination
failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem, and decreases the expected
costs of a MNB’s default, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB
strategically adjusts its structure to the new supervisory framework. It converts its subsidiary
into a branch, or conversely, with a view to reducing supervisory monitoring. We identify
the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher
costs to the deposit insurance fund, lower welfare, or closure of the MNB’s foreign unit. Current
reforms of MNB supervision should thus take into account that MNBs adapt their organizational
structures to changes in supervision.
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Introduction
Multinational banks (MNBs) operate both branches and subsidiaries in foreign countries. While
branches are primarily supervised by the same authority as their parent bank, foreign subsidiaries are
supervised by the host-country authorities, so that MNBs face a multiplicity of national authorities.
For example, Dexia was supervised by the authorities of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, and yet suffered a catastrophic failure which led to a 6 bln EUR bail-out in 2011.
Failures of this type raise questions about possible coordination issues among national supervisors.1
Accordingly, the supervision of multinational banks has been a central part of the policy debate since
the financial crisis.2 In 2014, the Euro area introduced a new supervisor, the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM), in an effort to centralize the supervision of the area’s largest banks. Importantly,
MNBs are adjusting their structure to this change. For instance, Nordea converted its subsidiaries
in Denmark, Finland, and Norway into branches in January 2017. At the end of 2017, the bank
announced a plan to move its headquarters from Sweden to Finland. As Finland is part of the Euro
area, this move ultimately transfers supervisory responsibility to the SSM.3
Despite the intense policy debate on this important issue, there is little theory to guide policy
makers on how to organize the supervision of multinational banks. We build a model in which
centralizing supervision solves coordination problems and decreases the public costs of a MNB’s
failure, keeping the organizational structure fixed. However, the MNB endogenously reacts to the
new supervisory arrangements by adjusting its structure, for instance by transforming a subsidiary
into a branch, or by closing the foreign unit altogether. Due to this endogenous reaction, we show
that centralizing supervision ultimately leads to less supervisory monitoring, and characterize the
conditions under which welfare decreases as a result. More generally, our model shows that reforms
of MNB supervision should be discussed in a framework in which an MNB’s organizational structure
is not fixed but is an equilibrium outcome.
Our model relies on two main ingredients. First, a MNB, incorporated in a “home” country,
1See Claessens and Van Horen (2013) for a recent review of the literature on cross-border banking, and Allen et
al. (2011) for a discussion of the policy issues. Beck, Todorov, and Wagner (2013) provide empirical evidence on the
shortcomings of cross-border supervision in Europe.
2See, for example, the Financial Stability Board 2011 document on “Global adherence to regulatory and supervisory
standards on international cooperation and information exchange,” the 10 December 2012 joint paper by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England, and Schoenmaker and Huttl (2015).
3More generally, the ECB’s report on the E.U. structural financial indicators shows that Euro area countries
had 550 branches and 310 subsidiaries from other E.U. countries in 2012, against 552 branches and 232 subsidiaries
in 2016 (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ecb.pr170530.en.html). This “branchification”
process seems at odds with a trend towards using more subsidiaries at the global level (see “The globalisation of
banking: How is regulation affecting global banks?”, BBVA Research, 8 August 2016).
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Subsidiary Branch
Deposit insurer of the home unit Home Home
Deposit insurer of the foreign unit Foreign Home
Supervisor of the home unit Home Home
Supervisor of the foreign unit Foreign Home
Home unit responsible for foreign unit’s liabilities No Yes
Foreign unit responsible for home unit’s liabilities Yes Yes
Table 1: Branches and subsidiaries.
chooses its organizational structure in a “foreign” country, namely whether to operate a subsidiary,
a branch, or no foreign unit at all, depending on how supervision is organized. Second, different
bank supervisors (home, foreign, and supranational) decide whether to monitor the bank, depending
on the MNB’s organizational structure. Both ingredients rely on institutional differences between
subsidiaries and branches, which we now explain (see Table 1 for a summary).
Subsidiaries are foreign incorporated entities protected by limited liability. Should the subsidiary
fail, foreign depositors have no claim on the assets of the home unit. If the subsidiary survives but
the home unit fails, foreign depositors have priority over the subsidiary’s assets, but the residual
assets can be used to repay depositors of the home unit. Deposits are insured in our model. Any
loss suffered by the subsidiary’s depositors are compensated by the foreign deposit insurance fund,
while losses of home depositors are compensated by the home deposit insurance fund. In contrast
to subsidiaries, branches share their liabilities and assets with the home unit, so that the depositors
of the parent bank and its branch have equal claims to the assets of both units. Depositors in both
countries are covered by the home deposit insurance fund.4
In the model, costly monitoring allows the supervisor to detect poorly performing assets and
4The Icelandic crisis showed how real the differences in deposit insurance coverage between branches and sub-
sidiaries could be in crisis periods. Two Icelandic banks, Landsbanki and Kaupthing, operated in the U.K. as a
branch (named Icesave) and as a subsidiary (Kaupthing UK), respectively. When Landsbanki (and with it Icesave)
failed, U.K. depositors lost their savings because the Icelandic Deposit Guarantee Scheme could not cope with the
large amount of deposit guarantees. Kaupthing depositors, however, were insured by the U.K.’s Deposit Insurance
Scheme, and were fully repaid.
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steer the bank towards safer activities, thereby reducing the risk of failure and the costs to the
deposit insurer.5 The MNB’s organizational structure affects which supervisor oversees the foreign
unit. Under national supervision, a foreign subsidiary is supervised by the foreign supervisor, whose
objective is to minimize losses to the foreign deposit insurance fund. Instead, a foreign branch is
supervised by the home supervisor, who wants to minimize the losses to the home deposit insurance
fund, which is liable for both units. Under supranational supervision, a single supervisor monitors
both units of the MNB, irrespective of the MNB’s structure, and aims at minimizing the losses to
both deposit insurance funds.
When the MNB operates a subsidiary and supervision is national, the MNB faces two supervi-
sors. The foreign supervisor exerts a twofold supervision externality on the home supervisor. First,
monitoring the foreign unit generates information allowing the home supervisor to monitor the
home unit only when the foreign unit’s assets perform poorly. We call this the monitoring effect.
Second, by making the foreign unit’s assets safer, supervision lowers the subsidiary’s profits. Since
these profits can be used to offset losses in the home unit, supervision of the foreign unit increases
the expected losses of the home deposit insurance fund. We call this the intervention effect.6 If the
MNB operates a branch instead, the home supervisor supervises both units and internalizes these
two effects.
Understanding the externality exerted by the foreign supervisor on the home supervisor allows us
to predict the consequences of introducing a supranational supervisor responsible for both units, and
thus internalizing the externality.7 When the monitoring effect outweighs the intervention effect,
supranational supervision leads to more monitoring of the subsidiary than national supervision,
while the opposite obtains when the intervention effect dominates. Monitoring of branches is not
affected by supranational supervision, as there is no externality in that case.
The next step is to understand how supranational supervision changes the MNB’s choice of
organizational structure. When the monitoring effect dominates, supranational supervision leads to
more monitoring of subsidiaries, hence lower profit under this structure, which pushes the MNB to
switch to a branch structure, or even to exit foreign operations altogether. When the intervention
5See Eisenbach, Lucca, and Townsend (2016) for a general theoretical treatment of bank supervision.
6A recent illustration of this situation is given by the Greek crisis: the supervisors of Greek banks’ subsidiaries in
Romania and Bulgaria considered liquidating them. This would have worsened the situation of their parent banks,
but this externality was not taken into account by the subsidiaries’ supervisors. The ECB had to extend credit lines
to these subsidiaries to avoid this outcome. See “ECB puts in place secret credit li*nes with Bulgaria and Romania”,
Financial Times Online, July 16, 2015.
7Given the limited liability of the parent bank towards its subsidiary, and that foreign depositors have priority
over home depositors in accessing the foreign unit’s assets, the home supervisor does not exert any externality on the
foreign supervisor in the model.
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effect dominates instead, supranational supervision leads to less monitoring of subsidiaries, hence
higher profit under this structure, thus pushing the MNB to switch to a subsidiary structure, or
even to open a new subsidiary abroad.
Importantly, in all cases the MNB’s reaction always goes towards reducing supervisory moni-
toring. For instance, when supranational supervision leads to more monitoring of subsidiaries, the
MNB switches to a branch structure, under which the supervisor optimally chooses to monitor less.
As a result, there is always (weakly) less monitoring of the MNB under supranational supervision
than under national supervision.
This observation is important to understand the impact of supranational supervision on welfare,
as measured by the sum of the bank’s profit and the costs to the public sector (deposit insurance
losses and monitoring costs). We show four main results:
(i) If supranational supervision does not affect the bank’s organizational structure, it always
reduces the costs to the public sector (not necessarily total welfare). This result reflects the gains
from coordinating supervision of the MNB’s units, holding its structure constant.
(ii) When the MNB adjusts its organizational structure to supranational supervision, converting
a subsidiary into a branch is associated with a welfare increase (despite the lower monitoring),
whereas converting a branch into a subsidiary is associated with a welfare decrease. In the latter
case, national supervision is a superior arrangement relative to supranational supervision because it
acts as a commitment to being tough with a subsidiary, and discourages the bank from using such
a structure.
(iii) Unless public funds are very costly, when supranational supervision leads the MNB to open
a foreign unit the impact on welfare is positive, whereas if the MNB closes its foreign unit the
impact is negative. In the latter case, national supervision acts as a commitment to being lenient
with a subsidiary, and encourages the MNB to operate abroad.
(iv) Finally, any change in organizational structure leads to a clear-cut redistribution of costs
between the deposit insurers of the two countries: by definition, when a subsidiary is opened this
increases the burden on the foreign deposit insurer, whereas when it is closed or converted into a
branch the entire burden falls on the home deposit insurer.
Our theory also has empirical implications on the effects of supranational supervision, such as
the introduction of the SSM. First, we predict that after such a change, foreign units that switch
from a subsidiary structure to a branch structure should be less profitable, whereas foreign units
that switch from a branch structure to a subsidiary structure should be more profitable. In both
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cases, monitoring should decrease. Second, we have predictions on whether a MNB will transform
a subsidiary into a branch or conversely, depending on the supervisory quality of both the home
and host countries. Third, we show how supervisory quality in both countries determines whether
a MNB reacts to supranational supervision by closing down a foreign unit or opening a new one.
More generally, our analysis suggests looking at the effects of supervision at the bank unit level and
not only at the banking group level, and that these effects should be interacted with both home
country and host country characteristics.
Finally, we consider several extensions of the model and check its robustness. First, we consider
alternative liability structures for the MNB, such as ring-fencing part of a subsidiary’s assets, or a
commitment from the parent bank to rescue a failing subsidiary. Second, we assume that depositors
are not fully insured and demand higher deposit rates in compensation for the losses they have to
bear upon failure of the MNB. We discuss how welfare could be maximized with risk-based insurance
premia that should depend on the MNB’s organizational structure and on the supervisors’ expected
monitoring decisions.
Our paper builds on two strands of the literature. First, several papers study frictions and con-
flicts of objectives between national regulators. Externalities lead independent national regulators
to choose suboptimal regulatory standards, in the form of too low capital requirements (Dalen and
Olsen (2003), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)), too lax intervention thresholds (Acharya (2003)),
or too coarse information sharing (Holthausen and Rønde (2004)). Several papers provide empirical
evidence of the divergence of objectives between bank supervisors, both in the U.S. (Agarwal et al.
(2014) and Rezende (2011)) and in the E.U. (Beck, Todorov, and Wagner (2013)).
Second, there is a literature looking at the endogenous choice of organizational structure of
financial intermediaries based on the different liability structures between branches and subsidiaries
(Kahn and Winton (2004), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010), Luciano and Wihlborg (2018)). None
of these papers consider supervision as a factor that could drive the choice between branches and sub-
sidiaries. Harr and Rønde (2004) and Loranth and Morrison (2007) study optimal capital regulation
and Calzolari and Loranth (2011) analyze optimal closure policies for branches and subsidiaries and
their impact on the choice of organizational structure by the bank.8 Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005)
and Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2007) empirically investigate the determinants of
MNBs’ organizational choice.
We combine these two strands of the literature in a model in which supervisory treatment and
8Calzolari and Loranth (2003) provide an overview of the issues in multinational bank supervision.
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frictions in supervision are key drivers of the choice of organizational structure by the MNB. In
particular, the optimal supervisory actions depend on the bank’s organizational structure and, in
turn, the bank’s organizational structure optimally responds to the anticipated supervisory actions.
Taking these feedback effects into account, we show that the choice of the organizational structure
profoundly affects the consequences of centralizing supervision.9
Our main example of supranational supervision is the Single Supervisory Mechanism.10 Hence,
we also contribute to a growing literature on the possible effects of this new architecture, with
a focus on MNBs and their organizational structure which is absent from prior work. Colliard
(2014) compares supranational to national supervision, focusing on the trade-off between worse
quality information and less biased incentives of supranational supervisors. Carletti, Dell’Ariccia,
and Marquez (2016) argue that local supervisors will have lower incentives to collect information if
decisions are taken by a central regulator. Beck and Wagner (2016) also study common supervision
but examine the problem of different regional preferences regarding financial stability.
Finally, Bolton and Oehmke (2016) and Faia and Weder di Mauro (2016) analyze how to wind
down global systematically important banks through bail-ins, and thus deal more generally with
the question of how to resolve multinational banks. We differ from these papers as our focus is on
ex ante incentives, in the form of monitoring and intervention, as opposed to ex post incentives that
arise upon bank failure.
1 Model
We first set up the model and then discuss its main assumptions.
1.1 Setup
We consider a multinational bank (MNB) operating two symmetric, equal-sized units in two coun-
tries: the home country h (where the MNB is incorporated) and the foreign country f . Each unit
i ∈ {h, f} invests locally in a portfolio of illiquid and risky projects. The quality q ∈ {g, b} of
the portfolio is uncertain. With probability θ, it is “good” (q = g) and pays out R > 1. With
9Our paper thus adds to the study of unintended consequences of regulation in general, a theme that goes back
to at least Peltzman (1976). Recent examples involving banking regulation include Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek
(2014), who show that tighter macroprudential requirements lead to a substitution of lending by local banks with
lending by branches of foreign banks, and Horváth and Wagner (2017), who illustrate that counter-cyclical capital
requirements may increase systemic risk taking.
10The mechanisms we highlight are also relevant to understand less extreme forms of supranational supervision,
such as bilateral agreements between supervisors. Beck, Silva-Buston, and Wagner (2018) give evidence on such
agreements and show that their existence is related to different proxies for gains from cooperation.
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probability 1− θ, it is “bad” (q = b) and pays out R with probability p < 1 only, and 0 otherwise.
Returns on the portfolios in the two countries are uncorrelated.11
Investments are financed by insured deposits normalized to 1 in each country. The deposit
insurance fund in charge fully reimburses depositors, so that the bank offers to repay 1.12
The bank maximizes the sum of its expected profits earned in the countries of activity.
Liability structure. By default, the bank is a “standalone” bank that operates a unit in the
home country only. In addition, the bank can open a foreign unit and become a MNB, using one
of the following organizational structures:13
- A subsidiary. A subsidiary is an asset of the parent bank. As such, it shares liabilities for the
home unit’s losses, but the reverse is not true. After foreign depositors are paid out, the remaining
assets in a solvent subsidiary are used against the home unit’s outstanding liabilities. No such
transfer is legally required from the home unit to an insolvent subsidiary. Each national supervisor
supervises its local unit and deposits are insured by the local deposit insurance fund.
- A branch. The two units share liability for each other’s losses. Failure occurs when the total
assets of the MNB in both units fall short of total liabilities, in which case the MNB’s assets are
distributed pro-rata to depositors in both countries. The supervisor in the home country oversees
supervision and insures depositors in both countries.
We additionally allow for operating costs CS (resp. CB) of running a subsidiary (resp. a branch).
Depending on the business model of the bank or the specificities of the foreign country, CS and CB
may in general be different.
Supervision. Supervision consists of monitoring and prudential interventions. Each unit
i ∈ {h, f} can be monitored at a cost ci > 0, so that the supervisor learns whether the unit’s
assets are good or bad. The parameter ci measures the monitoring difficulty. Monitoring enables
the supervisor to intervene in a unit with bad assets: the supervisor requires the bank to transfer
its assets into a safe project, with the same expected payoff but no risk. More specifically, after
intervention the asset pays r > 1 with certainty, and pR = r.14 We assume that, due to legal
restrictions, no intervention is possible in a unit that was not monitored. Note that intervention
11One of the drivers of MNBs’ expansion is risk diversification, which justifies uncorrelated projects. The analysis
of systemic risk is beyond the scope of this paper.
12With an equivalent interpretation of our model, the bank obtains funds from lenders in the wholesale funding
market who expect to be bailed out with probability one.
13In the following, we will indicate the foreign unit simply as “the subsidiary” or “the branch” depending on the
organizational structure.
14This assumption allows us to precisely identify the effect and strength of supervisory interventions, as explained
next. It is also in line with the evidence given in Hirtle, Kovner, and Plosser (2016) that bank supervision reduces
the volatility but not the mean of banks’ return on assets.
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reduces the bank’s profit, as it reduces the risk of the bank’s portfolio without affecting its mean
return, and the shareholders are protected by limited liability.
Under national supervision, local supervisors take monitoring and intervention decisions. More
precisely, with a subsidiary-MNB the home and the foreign supervisors choose non-cooperatively
whether to monitor and intervene in the unit they supervise. With a branch-MNB or a standalone
bank only the home supervisor takes such decisions.
Under supranational supervision, a supranational supervisor takes monitoring and intervention
decisions over both units. She faces the same information structure and costs as national supervisors.
Each national supervisor minimizes the sum of supervision costs, losses to the national deposit
insurance fund, and to the depositors.15 The supranational supervisor’s objective function is an
equally weighted sum of the expected payoffs that the national supervisors would obtain in the
two countries. Finally, we assume that public funds, used both to pay for monitoring costs and to
reimburse depositors when the bank fails, have a marginal cost of 1 + λ, with λ > 0.16
Information. In the case of two uncoordinated national supervisors, we assume that the home
supervisor can make his monitoring decision conditional on the information collected in the foreign
unit, if any. If there is a single supervisor, she can choose which unit to monitor first, and make her
monitoring decision in the other unit conditional on the state of the first unit.
Timeline. The following timeline summarizes the environment.
- t = 0: The supervisory architecture is announced. The bank faces either supranational or national
supervision.
- t = 1: The bank chooses whether to expand abroad with a subsidiary or a branch or, alternatively,
to remain a stand-alone bank in the home country.
- t = 2: In each unit, the supervisor in charge decides whether to monitor or not.
- t = 3: In each unit, the supervisor can conduct a prudential intervention if he monitored in t = 2
and the assets are bad.
- t = 4: Payoffs are realized. Successful assets return R (resp. r) for the risky (resp. safer) project,
and 0 otherwise. Depositors are repaid either by the bank, if solvent, or by the appropriate deposit
insurance fund.
15Losses to depositors are always null in the baseline model, but not in the extension of Section 5.2.
16The cost of public funds measures the loss incurred in raising additional revenues to finance public spending. See
Dahlby (2008) for a discussion of theoretical foundations and empirical estimates.
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Assumptions. To rule out trivial cases, we make two parametric assumptions:
pR > 1, (H1)
R < 2. (H2)
Condition (H1) means that bad assets still have a positive net present value, and (H2) implies that
the MNB cannot repay all depositors if only one unit is successful.
Notations. We denote with σ ∈ {S,B,A} the MNB’s decision of expanding abroad with a
subsidiary, with a branch, or to remain a stand-alone bank, respectively.
The decision of a supervisor in a given unit i ∈ {h, f} is twofold: first, whether to monitor unit i,
if applicable conditionally on the state of the other unit; second, whether to intervene in unit i. We
will show below that monitoring and intervention decisions taking place in unit i at t = 2 and t = 3
can be summarized in a single decision di, and that all but three possible decisions can be discarded.
Decision di = M (monitoring) consists in monitoring unit i, irrespective of what happens in the
other unit, and intervene if and only if its assets are bad. Decision di = C (conditional monitoring)
consists in monitoring unit i only if the other unit has bad assets, and intervene in unit i if and only
if its assets are bad. Decision di = O (open) consists in never monitoring unit i, and thus forgoing
the option of intervening in this unit.
We denote with Wh(dh, df ), Wf (df ), and Wb(dh, df ) the supervisors’ expected payoffs (not
weighted by 1 + λ) with the subsidiary-MNB (the first two) and with the branch-MNB (the third).
Wh(dh) is the home supervisor’s expected payoff when the bank remains domestic. Similarly,
Π(σ, dh, df ) denotes the expected profit of an MNB with the organizational structure σ ∈ {S,B}
and Π(A, dh) the profit of a stand-alone bank in country h, not including the costs C
S and CB.
Figure 1 summarizes the tree of the game for periods 1 and 2 when supervision is national.
1.2 Discussion
Bank supervision. Prudential supervision comprises a range of activities intended to address unsafe
practices that could jeopardize a bank’s viability.17 We assume that bank supervisors aim at
minimizing losses to the bank’s creditors, which in our setup corresponds to minimizing losses to
17We explicitly abstract from minimum capital requirements and convertible liabilities. Although these regulatory
tools may affect some of the decisions of a supervisor, they are unlikely to impact the incentives to choose one













chooses dh, df .
σ = A σ = S σ = B
Figure 1: Periods t = 1 and t = 2 under national supervision.
the deposit insurance fund.18 A prominent example of a supervisor with the objective of minimizing
losses to the deposit insurance fund is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. More broadly,
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2014) find that 57 percent of deposit insurance funds in the
world have responsibilities that include minimizing losses or risk to the fund.
Organizational structures. An important element of our analysis is that the MNB can choose
from three organizational structures, which define a liability structure and an allocation of super-
visory responsibilities. While the liability structures we assume correspond to the definitions of a
branch and a subsidiary, in practice and especially in a crisis, a MNB may not always follow these
rules. We discuss this possibility in Section 5.1.
Differences between subsidiaries and branches exist beyond the liability structure and supervi-
sory arrangements. These differences are subsumed in the parameters CS and CB. For instance,
being separate legal entities, subsidiaries typically have higher legal and administrative burdens
and may restrict the bank’s ability to reduce tax payments (Fiechter et al. (2011)), so that we
would expect to have CB ≤ CS . However, subsidiaries may have other advantages. For instance,
Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2007) find that foreign banks are more likely to enter via
subsidiaries when they plan to penetrate host markets.
Allocation of Supervisory Responsibilities. Our modeling assumptions reflect real-life arrange-
18Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) have argued that since dispersed depositors may be unable to monitor a bank, the
supervisor should step in and act in their interest. Indeed, in our model the supervisor acts as a perfect representative
of depositors (“representation hypothesis”) by assuming the control rights of debt holders.
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ments. Indeed, both in the E.U. and in the U.S., the competent authority for the supervision of
a branch is the one where the bank is initially licensed. Subsidiaries are incorporated in the host
country and are supervised locally. The main example of supranational supervision is the European
SSM. Since November 2014, the European Central Bank is entrusted with the primary responsibility
for supervising the most significant Euro Area banks. Our modelling of supranational supervision
in the paper corresponds to this supervisory architecture.
The U.S. banking system also provides an interesting example of externalities between super-
visory authorities. For instance, Wells Fargo & Company (WFC) is a bank holding company
supervised by the Federal Reserve, which operates multiple subsidiaries and branches domestically
and internationally. Its primary subsidiary is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., a national bank supervised
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, but WFC also operates Wells Fargo Bank, Ltd., a
California State Bank supervised by the California Department of Business Oversight - Division of
Financial Institutions. The supervisors of the national bank and the state bank both exert exter-
nalities on each other and on the supervisor of the bank holding company, which can be interpreted
as the supranational supervisor (see Agarwal et al. (2014) for evidence of conflicts of objectives
between State and Federal supervisors).
Monitoring difficulty and information. The monitoring difficulty ci should be thought of as
related to the legal and institutional framework in country i, as we discuss in Section 4.1. We
abstract from potential differences of expertise or cost-efficiency between national and supranational
supervisors and assume they face the same cost, so as to focus the analysis on the different incentives
of these two levels. Adding an informational friction for the supranational supervisor would clearly
mitigate the benefit of centralized supervision, but this effect would be orthogonal to the main
mechanisms we consider.
Our model assumes that information generated by monitoring the foreign unit is shared with
the home supervisor. Indeed, as will become clear below, the foreign supervisor has nothing to gain
by hiding information. Our assumption can thus be seen as the outcome of a simple waiting game,
in which in equilibrium the foreign supervisor would take his monitoring decision as soon as he can,
and the home supervisor would take his decision immediately after.19
19See, for example, Repullo (2001) and Holthausen and Rønde (2004) for models with strategic information sharing.
Our analysis would also hold if information sharing between national supervisors were assumed to be impossible: in
that case, there would be a clear rationale for centralizing supervision so as to allow for communication. Our model
shows that such a rationale exists even without informational frictions between the two supervisors.
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2 National supervisors and the multinational bank
By choosing whether to organize as a subsidiary or a branch, the MNB effectively decides whether it
faces two uncoordinated supervisors, or a single supervisor. In this Section, we study the monitoring
and prudential decisions of independent national supervisors for the different structures that the
MNB can adopt. We begin the analysis with the benchmark case of a standalone bank.
2.1 Supervision of a standalone bank
Consider the supervision of a standalone bank in country h, with a single supervisor and hence no
friction in supervision. If the supervisor does not monitor, the deposit insurance fund suffers a loss
of 1 when the risky project fails, which happens with probability (1− θ)(1− p). We thus have:
Wh(O) = −(1− θ)(1− p). (1)
If instead the supervisor monitors the home unit, at cost ch, he can intervene when the assets are bad,
which happens with probability 1− θ. Intervention makes the bank invest in a safe project. Hence,
losses to the deposit insurance fund are reduced to zero and the cost is equal to the monitoring cost:
Wh(M) = −ch. (2)
Comparing these two payoffs gives the supervisor’s optimal decision for the stand-alone, dah:
dah =

M if ch ≤ c∗
O if ch > c
∗,
(3)
with c∗ = (1− θ)(1− p). (4)
The supervisor simply compares the cost of monitoring to c∗, which can be interpreted as the value
of monitoring, i.e., the lower probability of having to reimburse 1 to depositors when the unit is
monitored. This value is larger when the unit is riskier (θ is low).
2.2 Supervision of a subsidiary-MNB
We now consider the interaction of the two national supervisors of a subsidiary-MNB. Because
foreign depositors have priority over the subsidiary’s assets and the home unit has limited liability
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for the subsidiary’s losses, the decision in the home unit affects neither the intervention nor the
monitoring of the foreign supervisor. From the foreign supervisor’s perspective, the subsidiary is
equivalent to a stand-alone bank in country f , and the optimal decision d∗f is defined exactly like
dah in (3), irrespective of the home supervisor’s decision.
The situation is different for the home supervisor. First, if the foreign unit is monitored, the
home supervisor can condition his monitoring decision on the state of the other unit. Formally, he
can select a decision dh ∈ {O,C,M}, compared to dh ∈ {O,M} if the foreign unit is not monitored.
Second, the home supervisor can offset losses in the home unit by using the residual assets of the
foreign unit, that is, the value of its assets above what is used to reimburse foreign depositors.
The value of residual assets depends on the foreign supervisor’s decision df . To see this, denote by
ρq(df ) the expected value of residual assets when the foreign assets are of quality q ∈ {g, b}, and
denote by ρ(df ) = θρg(df ) + (1− θ)ρb(df ) the unconditional expected value of the residual assets.
We have:
ρg(O) = R− 1 ρb(O) = p(R− 1) (5)
ρg(M) = R− 1 ρb(M) = r − 1. (6)
Using these definitions, we can solve for the optimal decision of the home supervisor by maximizing
Wh(dh, df ) in dh, both for df = O and df = M . We obtain:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium decisions (d∗h, d
∗
f ) of the supervisors of a subsidiary-MNB are:
(i) The foreign supervisor chooses d∗f = O if cf > c
∗, in which case the home supervisor chooses
d∗h = M if ch ≤ c∗[1− ρ(O)], and d∗h = O otherwise.
(ii) The foreign supervisor chooses d∗f = M if cf ≤ c∗, in which case the home supervisor chooses
d∗h = M if ch ≤ c∗[1− ρg(M)], d∗h = C if ch ∈ (c∗[1− ρg(M)], c∗[1− ρb(M)]], and d∗h = O otherwise.
Fig. 2 below illustrates the pattern of decisions in the (ch, cf ) space. It is easy to show that
c∗[1− ρg(M)] ≤ c∗[1− ρ(O)] ≤ c∗[1− ρb(M)], so that the positioning of the different regions in the
graph is a general result. The key idea here is the following. Monitoring a standalone unit allows
to avoid a cost of 1 to the deposit insurance fund with probability (1− θ)(1− p) = c∗. In contrast,
in the presence of a subsidiary, the cost to the home deposit insurance fund in case of default is
not simply 1, but 1 minus the residual assets of the subsidiary. The incentives to monitor the home
unit thus decrease with the value of residual assets in the foreign unit. As monitoring the foreign
unit reduces the expected value of its residual assets, it also increases the incentives to monitor the
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home unit.
2.3 Supervision of a branch-MNB
There are three differences when we move from the subsidiary case to the branch: (i) a single
supervisor now takes the decisions (dh, df ) for both units; (ii) the assets of the home unit can be
used to pay back depositors when the foreign unit defaults; (iii) both the domestic and foreign
depositors are covered by the home deposit insurance. Except for the monitoring costs, the two
units are entirely symmetric in the branch case. We can focus the analysis on the case ch ≤ cf and
obtain the other case by symmetry. The following Proposition characterizes the optimal decisions
depending on the monitoring costs of the two units:
Proposition 2. When ch ≤ cf , the optimal decisions (dbh, dbf ) of the supervisor of a branch-MNB
are:
(M,M) obtains for cf ≤ c∗[1− ρg(M)] and cf + ch ≤ 2c∗[1− ρ(O)];
(M,C) for cf ∈ (c∗[1−ρg(M)], c∗[1−ρb(M)]] and ch+(1−θ)cf ≤ c∗[1−ρ(O)]+(1−θ)c∗[1−ρb(O)];
(M,O) for cf ≥ c∗[1− ρb(M)] and ch ≤ c∗[1− c∗ − ρ(O)];
(O,O) otherwise.





Although the complete characterization is lengthy, the intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple:
When monitoring costs are low in both units, the optimum is to exert monitoring in both. When
monitoring costs are both high there is no monitoring at all. If one cost is low and the other is
intermediate, the “cheaper” home unit is always monitored, whereas the other unit is monitored
only when home assets are bad (case (M,C)). Fig. 2 illustrates the pattern of decisions and how
they compare with the subsidiary case. In particular, we observe the following:
Corollary 1. The branch structure leads to less monitoring than the subsidiary structure: (i) If
the foreign unit is not monitored with a subsidiary-MNB, it is not monitored with a branch-MNB
either: d∗f = O ⇒ dbf = O; (ii) If neither unit is monitored with a subsidiary-MNB, they are not
monitored with a branch-MNB either: (d∗h, d
∗
f ) = (O,O)⇒ (dbh, dbf ) = (O,O).
As discussed in Section 2.2, the incentives to monitor a given unit decrease in the expected
amount of residual assets in the other unit. With a branch structure, losses in the foreign unit
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Figure 2: Equilibrium supervisory decisions under national supervision of a subsidiary and a branch,
as functions of the monitoring costs ch and cf . The parameters are θ = 1/2, p = 3/4, R = 1.5.
structure. As a result, the incentives to monitor any unit are lower with a branch than with a
subsidiary. In a sense, the branch structure is a way for the MNB to commit the value of its home
assets to reimbursing losses in the foreign unit, and thus optimally generate less monitoring.
3 Supranational supervision
We now turn to the case of a supranational supervisor. We first solve for the supervisor’s decision
for a given organizational structure of the MNB. We then study the organizational structure chosen
by the MNB, anticipating the decision of the supranational supervisor. Finally, we conclude this
section with an analysis of the welfare impact of introducing supranational supervision.
3.1 Impact of supranational supervision for a given organizational structure
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve for the supervisor’s decision in t = 2 and t = 3,
for a given organizational structure chosen by the MNB in t = 1. Recall that the supranational
supervisor maximizes the joint expected payoffs of the deposit insurance funds in both countries,
net of supervision costs. For the branch and the stand-alone cases, the supranational supervisor
thus has the same objective function as the national supervisor, so that we only need to focus on the
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case of a subsidiary-MNB. In that case, the supranational supervisor’s decision (dh, df ) maximizes




f ) the optimal decisions.
We want to identify the cases in which the supranational supervisor’s decisions (d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f ) are
different from (d∗h, d
∗








f ) can both take
five values, so that there are 20 different possibilities to consider. This number can be substantially
reduced by observing the following:
Lemma 1. National and supranational supervision in a subsidiary-MNB may lead to a different
outcome only if the decision in the foreign unit is different: If d∗f = d
∗∗





Intuitively, the foreign supervisor exerts an externality on the home supervisor, while the oppo-
site is not true. For a given decision in the foreign unit, minimizing the losses of the home deposit
insurance fund is equivalent to minimizing the total losses of both funds. Hence, supranational
supervision can lead to a different outcome only if it affects the supervision of the foreign unit.
To understand the impact of foreign supervision on the home unit, we can compute the difference
between the best payoff attainable by the home supervisor when the foreign supervisor monitors,
minus the best payoff he can achieve when the foreign supervisor does not monitor. This is what






To better understand the externality exerted by the foreign supervisor, we can further decompose
SE into two components:
SE = ηM + ηI (8)










The quantity ηM measures a monitoring effect : when the foreign unit is monitored, this allows
the home supervisor to condition monitoring on the state of the foreign unit. This quantity is
non-negatie, by definition. The quantity ηI measures instead a non-positive intervention effect :
monitoring the foreign unit decreases the expected value of its residual assets and negatively affects
the home supervisor, as seen in Section 2.2. The sign of the supervision externality thus depends
on the balance between a positive monitoring effect and a negative intervention effect. Using
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Proposition 1, we compute ηM and ηI explicitly:
ηM =

0 if ch ≤ c∗[1− ρg(M)]
θ[ch − c∗(1− ρg(M))] if ch ∈ (c∗[1− ρg(M)], c∗[1− ρ(M)]]
(1− θ)[c∗(1− ρb(M))− ch] if ch ∈ (c∗[1− ρ(M)], c∗[1− ρb(M)]]
0 if ch > c
∗[1− ρb(M)].
(11)
Intuitively, ηM captures the benefit of decision C over the best alternative M or O under national
supervision. When the best alternative is M , decision C allows to not monitor the home unit when
the foreign unit has good assets. This happens with probability θ, in which case the supervisor
saves ch in monitoring costs but incurs some losses, equal to c
∗(1− ρg(M)), when the home assets
are bad (the second line in (11)). Conversely, compared to O, decision C allows to monitor the
home unit when the foreign assets are bad (i.e. with probability 1 − θ), which reduces expected
losses by c∗(1− ρb(M)), but costs ch (the third line). If the monitoring costs ch are sufficiently low,
C is always dominated by M ; if they are sufficiently high, C is dominated by O, and in both cases
the monitoring effect is thus null (the first and fourth lines). ηI is given by:
ηI =

0 if ch ≤ c∗[1− ρ(O)]
−(ch − c∗[1− ρ(O)]) if ch ∈ (c∗[1− ρ(O)], c∗[1− ρ(M)]]
−c∗[ρ(O)− ρ(M)] if ch > c∗[1− ρ(M)].
(12)
To understand why ηI is non-positive, notice that when the home unit fails, the home deposit
insurance fund is de facto the new owner of the MNB. It benefits from the upside of the subsidiary,
but the downside is absorbed by the foreign deposit insurance fund. As a result, the home supervisor
prefers the subsidiary to adopt a risky strategy and is always hurt by interventions in the foreign
unit. Thus, the foreign supervisor intervenes too much from the point of view of the home supervisor.
From Lemma 1 and the two effects at play, we deduce that supranational supervision can lead
to a different outcome from national supervision only if the supranational supervisor monitors
the foreign unit more than the foreign supervisor because the monitoring effect prevails, or if she
monitors the foreign unit less than the foreign supervisor because the intervention effect prevails.
The following Proposition summarizes these two cases:
Proposition 3. Supranational supervision leads to a different outcome from national supervision
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if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) ch is such that SE > 0 and cf ∈ [c∗, c∗ + SE]. Then d∗f = O and (d∗∗h , d∗∗f ) = (C,M).
(ii) ch is such that SE < 0 and cf ∈ [c∗ + SE, c∗]. Then d∗f = M and d∗∗f = O.
The Appendix A.5 gives the exact conditions on the parameters and all possible cases.
Fig. 3 illustrates the pattern of decisions of the supranational supervisor, and the two cases of
Proposition 3. The most important property is that the impact of supranational supervision depends
unambiguously on cf : supranational supervision can lead to more monitoring of the foreign unit
only when cf > c
∗, and to less monitoring only when cf ≤ c∗. The cost ch then determines the

























Subsidiary - Supranational supervision
Figure 3: Equilibrium supervisory decisions under national and supranational supervision of a
subsidiary, as functions of the monitoring costs ch and cf . The dashed regions in the right panel are
those in which supranational supervision leads to more monitoring of the foreign unit (for cf > c
∗),
or to less monitoring (for cf < c
∗). The parameters are θ = 1/2, p = 3/4, R = 1.5.
This Proposition has a clear implication on how supranational supervision affects the MNB’s
profit:
Corollary 2. Introducing a supranational supervisor leads to a (weakly) lower profit for a subsidiary-
MNB if cf > c
∗, and to a (weakly) higher profit otherwise.
When cf > c
∗, the monitoring effect implies that the supranational supervisor exerts more
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monitoring than uncoordinated national supervisors, and thus intervenes more, so that the MNB is
less profitable. Conversely, when cf ≤ c∗, the intervention effect dominates and the supranational
supervisor intervenes less, which increases the MNB’s profit.
3.2 Impact of supranational supervision on the optimal organizational structure
We now consider the organizational structure chosen by the bank in t = 1, which depends on
a trade-off between four different elements: (i) for given supervisory decisions, the MNB enjoys
a higher implicit subsidy from deposit insurance with a subsidiary structure than with a branch
structure; (ii) the branch structure leads to less monitoring than the subsidiary structure; (iii) the
costs CS and CB; (iv) the profit that can be obtained by opening an additional unit compared
to remaining a stand-alone bank. Introducing supranational supervision alters this trade-off by
affecting (ii). From Corollary 2, we immediately deduce:
Proposition 4. (i) If cf > c
∗, there always exists parameter values such that supranational super-
vision leads to a switch from a subsidiary-MNB to a branch-MNB, or to a switch from a subsidiary-
MNB to a stand-alone bank. No other change of organizational structure is possible.
(ii) If cf < c
∗, there always exists parameter values such that supranational supervision leads to
a switch from a branch-MNB to a subsidiary-MNB, or to a switch from a stand-alone bank to a
subsidiary-MNB. No other change of organizational structure is possible.
Recall that supranational supervision does not affect branch-MNBs and stand-alone banks, but
only subsidiary-MNBs. Using Corollary 2, the different ways supranational supervision can affect
the optimal structure of the MNB are intuitive.
When cf > c
∗, the supranational supervisor internalizes the monitoring effect and monitors the
subsidiary more, thus reducing the subsidiary’s profit. The MNB can react by opening a branch
instead of a subsidiary. If the cost CB of operating a branch is so large that a stand-alone bank is
more profitable than a branch, then the MNB shuts down its foreign activities altogether.
When instead cf ≤ c∗, the supranational supervisor internalizes the intervention effect and
monitors the subsidiary less, thus increasing the subsidiary’s profit. The MNB can react by opening
a subsidiary instead of a branch. If operating a branch is costly, the bank may not be able to open
a foreign unit at all under national supervision, but may decide to expand abroad with a foreign
subsidiary after supranational supervision is introduced.
Supranational supervision thus has opposite consequences on the MNB’s structure depending
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on whether cf is larger than c
∗. Fortunately, which case obtains depends on a simple criterion: if
monitoring the foreign unit is costly then supranational supervision fosters a switch to the branch
structure or domestic retreat. If monitoring the foreign unit is cheap then supranational supervision
favors the subsidiary structure or foreign expansion.
3.3 Supranational supervision and welfare
Finally, we analyze the impact of supranational supervision on total welfare. Welfare can be ex-
pressed as the sum of the MNB’s profit and the total public costs, weighted by 1+λ, which comprise
the monitoring costs and the expected losses of the two deposit insurance funds. Note that deposi-
tors always break even and do not need to be considered in welfare computations. First, we consider
the case in which supranational supervision leaves the MNB’s organizational structure unchanged:
Corollary 3. If the parameters are such that the MNB adopts a subsidiary structure both under
national and supranational supervision, and (d∗h, d
∗
f ) 6= (d∗∗h , d∗∗f ), then (i) if cf ≥ c∗ the total public
costs decrease, the MNB’s profit decreases, and there exists λ̄1 > 0 such that total welfare increases
if and only if λ ≥ λ̄1; (ii) if cf < c∗ the total public costs decrease, the MNB’s profit increases, and
total welfare increases.
When the MNB does not find it optimal to adjust its organizational structure, centralizing
supervision thus always decreases the total public costs. Interestingly, when cf < c
∗ the MNB also
benefits from supranational supervision: due to the intervention effect the foreign supervisor was
intervening too much, at the expense of both the MNB and the home supervisor.
When instead the MNB can adjust its organizational structure, supranational supervision can
actually increase total public costs:
Corollary 4. If the parameters are such that the MNB has a foreign unit both under national and
supranational supervision but with different organizational structures, and CB ≤ CS, then (i) if
cf ≥ c∗ the MNB switches from a subsidiary to a branch, the total public costs decrease, the MNB’s
profit decreases, and total welfare increases; (ii) if cf < c
∗ the MNB switches from a branch to a
subsidiary, the total public costs increase, the MNB’s profit increases, and total welfare decreases.
We focus here on the case of higher operating costs for the subsidiary, i.e., CB ≤ CS , which
seems empirically more relevant (see p. 10).20 In this case, a branch is better for total welfare than a
20The results on profits and total welfare can be reversed if CB is sufficiently larger than CS instead, but the results
on total public costs are unaffected.
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subsidiary: because both units support each other, branch-MNBs require less supervision (Corollary
1) and allow to save on monitoring costs, and the operating costs are also lower.21 When cf ≥ c∗,
the supranational supervisor monitors the subsidiary more, which incentivizes the MNB to use a
branch instead, which improves welfare. Conversely, when cf < c
∗, the supranational supervisor
monitors the subsidiary less, and the MNB can switch from a branch to a subsidiary, which harms
welfare. In such a case, national supervision is a better arrangement than supranational supervision.
It is a way for supervisors to commit to being tough on a subsidiary and make the MNB prefer the
branch structure. Similarly, national supervision can be necessary to have the MNB invest abroad:
Corollary 5. If the parameters are such that supranational supervision affects the MNB’s decision
to open a foreign unit, there exist λ̄2 > 0 and λ̄3 > 0 such that: (i) if cf ≥ c∗ then the MNB shuts
down its subsidiary and becomes a stand-alone bank, the total public costs decrease, the MNB’s profit
decreases, and total welfare decreases if λ ≤ λ̄2; (ii) if cf < c∗ then the MNB opens a subsidiary
abroad, the total public costs increase, the MNB’s profit increases, and total welfare increases if
λ ≤ λ̄3.
Unless the cost of public funds λ is too large, opening a foreign unit is socially valuable. Then, an
unintended effect of increasing the monitoring of the subsidiary can be to make the MNB withdraw
from the foreign country, which harms total welfare. In this case again national supervision is more
desirable than supranational supervision. In contrast to the previous Corollary, national supervision
can be desirable here as a commitment to being lenient with the subsidiary, so as not to discourage
the MNB from opening a unit abroad.
Finally, notice that supranational supervision also leads to a redistributive effect among the two
national deposit insurance funds:
Corollary 6. If the parameters are such that supranational supervision affects the MNB’s structure,
(i) if cf ≥ c∗ the losses to the home deposit insurance fund increase, while losses to the foreign deposit
insurance fund become null; (ii) if cf < c
∗ the losses to the home deposit insurance fund decrease,
while losses to the foreign deposit insurance fund become strictly positive.
The redistributive effect is intuitive: when the MNB’s organizational structure changes from
subsidiary to branch or from subsidiary to stand-alone, the foreign deposit insurance fund is no
21Note that when CB = CS , for given supervisory decisions the branch structure leads to a higher welfare than
the subsidiary structure. Indeed, as the failure of either unit triggers the default of the bank and implies that all the
bank’s assets are used to reimburse depositors, this structure minimizes the losses of the deposit insurance fund. The
branch structure thus provides a form of “coinsurance”, as in Banal-Estanol, Ottaviani, and Winton (2013), but for
a different reason.
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longer liable, and the home deposit insurance fund either becomes liable for an extra unit (branch
case), or loses access to the foreign unit’s residual assets (stand-alone case). The opposite obtains
when the MNB’s organizational structure changes from stand-alone or branch to subsidiary.
4 Empirical implications
We briefly review the main testable implications of the model in this Section. We first discuss how
the variables of our model can be mapped to the data, and then give three implications relating the
MNB’s change in organizational structure with the level of supervisory monitoring and with the
quality of supervision.
4.1 Mapping the model to the data
The main endogenous variable of the model is the MNB’s organizational structure, which is empiri-
cally observable. There is significant heterogeneity in the organizational structures of MNBs in the
data.22 The empirical literature illustrates that the decision on the type of organizational structure
depends on several factors, including differences in regulation and supervision, which we focus on
(see for example Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria (2007) and Fiechter et al. (2011)).
The other important endogenous variable in the model is the intensity of supervisory monitoring
in each unit, (dh, df ). This can be estimated directly with data on hours spent by bank supervisors
(as in Eisenbach, Lucca, and Townsend (2016)), or indirectly by using market and accounting vari-
ables (Carbo-Valverde, Kane, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012)), or by measuring the bank’s asset
risk. For instance, Fiordelisi, Ricci, and Stentella Lopes (2017) show that the SSM led European
banks to rebalance their portfolios towards safer assets on average, which is in line with increased
monitoring by the supranational supervisor when the monitoring effect dominates the intervention
effect. We also give predictions on the MNB’s profitability, which is easily observable.
Our model relates these endogenous variables to the centralization of supervision, of which the
creation of the SSM is the prime empirical example, and to supervisory monitoring costs. The
monitoring costs ch and cf can be linked to the efficiency of supervision at the country level,
as proxied for instance by the “Official Supervisory Action Variables” and “Official Supervisory
Structural Variables” in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013).
22See the ECB data on structural financial indicators mentioned in Footnote 3.
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4.2 Correlations between organizational structure, monitoring, and profit
A first empirical exercise suggested by our model is to look at foreign units of MNBs in the Euro area
after the introduction of the SSM and test how their profitability, monitoring and organizational
structure are affected. A simple implication of Proposition 3 is the following:
Implication 1. Consider the foreign subsidiary of a MNB. If its organizational structure does
not change following the introduction of supranational supervision, supervisory monitoring of the
subsidiary increases (resp. decreases) and profitability decreases (resp. increases) if the monitoring
costs cf are high (resp. low). A foreign branch is unaffected.
This implication applies in particular in the short-run, before MNBs are able to adjust their
organizational structure to the new supervisory environment. In the long-run, accounting for the
possibility of a change in the organizational structure:
Implication 2. When a MNB changes its organizational structure following the introduction of
supranational supervision, monitoring (weakly) decreases in both the home and the foreign units.
If a subsidiary is transformed into a branch the total profit of the MNB decreases, if a branch is
converted into a subsidiary the total profit increases.
Simple inspection of Figures 2 and 3 shows this implication. When supranational supervision
would intensify monitoring of the subsidiary (i.e. cf > c
∗), the decisions of the national supervisors
are (M,O) and the bank, by switching to a branch-MNB, induces decisions (O,O). When instead
supranational supervision reduces monitoring of the subsidiary (i.e. cf ≤ c∗), the bank faces
decisions (O,O) both with the original branch structure and with the new subsidiary structure.
These predictions are quite specific to our model, as they depend on the endogenous adjustment
of the MNB’s organizational structure to the level of supervision. In particular, two points are quite
counter-intuitive: (i) a change in the organizational structure of the foreign unit also has an impact
on monitoring in the home unit; (ii) when supranational supervision leads to more monitoring of
a subsidiary, the endogenous change in organizational structure ultimately leads to less monitoring
of the foreign unit.
4.3 Explaining changes in the organizational structure
Our model gives predictions on which foreign units will be affected by the introduction of suprana-
tional supervision, and on whether subsidiaries will be transformed into branches or the opposite,
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or whether a foreign unit will be closed or opened. To test such predictions, one can conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis as in Fiordelisi, Ricci, and Stentella Lopes (2017), who estimate
the average impact of the SSM on the affected banking groups, also allowing for country-specific
effects. Our model suggests to extend such an analysis in two directions: (i) to test our model,
the analysis must be conducted at the banking unit level, not at the banking group level; (ii) while
the average impact of the SSM is potentially ambiguous, the cross-sectional heterogeneity of this
impact can be explained by both home and host country characteristics, so that one should interact
the SSM “treatment” with such characteristics, or consider home/host country pairs, as in, e.g.,
Karolyi and Taboada (2015).
Our main predictions regarding the change in organizational structure derive from Proposition
3, and are illustrated by the right panel of Fig. 3:
Implication 3. If cf is high and ch takes an intermediate value, a foreign subsidiary may be turned
into a branch, or shut down.
If cf is low and ch is high, a foreign branch may be turned into a subsidiary, or a new foreign
subsidiary opened.
A way to test these predictions would be to compare banking units in the same host country
with parent banks in different home countries (impact of ch), and units in different host countries
with parent banks in the same home country, or even with the same parent bank (impact of cf ).
This implication can be related to the literature on cross-border acquisitions (opening a sub-
sidiary) and divestitures (closing a foreign unit). We expect supranational supervision to lead to
more acquisitions of banks in countries with low monitoring costs, and fewer in other countries.
The counter-intuitive case in which supranational supervision leads to divestiture and a decrease in
cross-border activities is particularly interesting. When this happens, it means that the subsidiary
was profitable only because it was weakly supervised, corresponding to a case in which multinational
banks invest via subsidiaries in countries with weaker supervision to take more risk (e.g., Ongena,
Popov, and Udell (2013)). Indeed, there is evidence that banks from well-regulated countries tend
to acquire banks in more weakly-regulated areas (see Karolyi and Taboada (2015)), and that acqui-
sitions are partly driven by MNB’s wanting to extract more safety net subsidies (Carbo-Valverde,
Kane, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012)).
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5 Extensions
In this Section we develop several extensions of the baseline model: ring-fencing of the subsidiary’s
assets, support of the subsidiary by the parent bank, the possibility that the deposit insurance
fund is unable to repay the depositors, failure-related externalities, and “organizational structure-
sensitive” deposit insurance premia.
5.1 Alternative liability structures
Our model is versatile enough to consider variations of the subsidiary’s liability structure on our
main results. Here, we consider ring-fencing the subsidiary’s assets, and the possibility that the
parent bank rescues a failing subsidiary.
Ring-fencing. Assume that when the home unit fails, and the foreign unit is successful, the
home supervisor can only use a fraction β ≤ 1 of the subsidiary’s residual assets. The analysis of
the baseline model remains valid, except that the quantities ρ and ρi have to be multiplied by β.
This reduction of the value of the foreign unit’s residual assets increases the incentives to monitor
the home unit. This reinforces the result of Corollary 1: under ring-fencing, a subsidiary-MNB is
even more likely to face more monitoring than a branch. Thus, the main trade-off between the two
structures remains qualitatively similar for the MNB.
Interestingly, ring-fencing lowers welfare in our model by reducing the fraction of foreign residual
assets that the home supervisor can use to reimburse depositors of a failed home unit. This implies
that the home supervisor needs to raise more of the costly public resources in order to make up for
the losses of the home unit.23
To understand how ring-fencing affects our results on supranational supervision, note that the
intervention effect ηI is still given by (12), but with the residual assets multiplied by β. A simple
inspection of the expressions shows that as ring-fencing increases, i.e., β decreases, the magnitude
of the intervention effect decreases. Ring-fencing decreases the residual assets that the home su-
pervisor can access and thereby lowers the impact of foreign intervention on the home supervisor’s
cost. Similarly, the expression for the monitoring effect ηM is still given by (11), but with the resid-
ual assets multiplied by β. It is easy to check that ring-fencing diminishes the monitoring effect
when monitoring the home unit is optimal under national supervision, while it accentuates it when
monitoring the home unit is not optimal under national supervision.
23See Cerutti et al. (2010) for an empirical estimate of the costs, in terms of capital, of different ring-fencing
frameworks for European banks regarding their subsidiaries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.
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Ring-fencing can thus affect the impact of supranational supervision in diverse ways. If the
MNB’s home unit is not monitored under national supervision, then more ring-fencing of the sub-
sidiary makes it more likely that supranational supervision leads to more monitoring of the sub-
sidiary and possibly a switch from subsidiary to branch. If the MNB’s home unit is monitored, then
more ring-fencing has an ambiguous effect on the supervision externality and may make it either
more or less likely that supranational supervision leads to more monitoring.
Rescue of failed subsidiaries. The MNB may choose to use some of the home unit’s assets
to rescue a failing subsidiary, for instance due to reputational issues.24 In our model, the home unit
never has sufficient funds to prevent the foreign unit from failing (assumption (H2)). However, the
bank can use the residual assets of the home unit to partially reimburse depositors in the foreign
country. Even in this case, there is still less pooling of resources with a subsidiary organization than
with a branch organization, under which the home unit’s assets are used to reimburse depositors in
both countries, equally. Thus, the difference in liability structures between branches and subsidiaries
is still relevant.
Interestingly, this variant of the model also introduces two new externalities: because now the
foreign supervisor can use the home unit’s residual assets, the home supervisor exerts both an
intervention effect and a monitoring effect on the foreign supervisor. While a full analysis of the
impact of supranational supervision in this case is beyond the scope of this paper, the presence of
additional externalities suggests that the outcomes of national and supranational supervision may
differ even more than in the baseline version of the model.
5.2 Weak deposit insurance
In countries with a high level of government debt or a large banking sector relative to GDP, the gov-
ernment’s ability to honor formal commitments to depositors raises considerable doubts (Demirguc-
Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2014)). In this subsection, we consider the impact of weak deposit
insurance on our results.
Intuitively, weak deposit insurance affects the rate at which depositors are willing to lend to
the bank: the less credible the deposit insurance in charge is, the higher is the rate demanded by
24It is not to be expected that MNBs are always going to rescue their subsidiaries. For instance, during the Argentine
crisis of 2000-2001 Credit Agricole reduced its losses by permitting a government takeover of its subsidiaries. Similarly,
Bayerische Landesbank gave up its Croatian subsidiary following large-scale deposit withdrawals in 2002. During the
recent financial crisis policymakers were concerned that European MNBs would withdraw support and funding from
their subsidiaries in emerging Europe, and launched the Vienna Initiative to avoid such an outcome, see for example
Haas et al. (2015).
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depositors. Higher deposit rates in turn imply lower residual assets that can be transferred from a
solvent unit to reduce losses in a failing one. Hence, as we argue more formally below, the effect of
a weak deposit insurance on our results is qualitatively similar to the one of ring-fencing.
To accommodate for the effect of weak deposit insurance, assume that the deposit insurance
fund in country i fully reimburses depositors only with probability αi ≤ 1. Since depositors can
now make a loss on their deposit, they demand a higher rate than the risk-free one. For example,
in the case of the subsidiary, between t = 1 and t = 2 the bank offers interest rates Ph ≥ 1 and
Pf ≥ 1 to depositors in the two countries, who then choose whether to deposit or not. Depositors
in country i are repaid Pi when the unit is successful, or the deposit insurance fund can repay, but
only receive the residual assets available on the balance sheet when the deposit insurance fund is
unable to pay. The rates Pi are determined endogenously and make depositors indifferent between
depositing their money at the bank or not. Importantly, not fully credible deposit insurance makes
the rate dependent on the supervisors’ decisions. Depositors in the foreign subsidiary for instance
ask for a rate Pf (df ) defined by:
θPf (M) + (1− θ)Pf (M) = 1 (13)
θPf (O) + (1− θ)[pPf (O) + (1− p)αf ] = 1. (14)
When the supervisor monitors, the corresponding unit is always solvent: the deposit rate is equal
to 1 and does not depend on the credibility of the deposit insurance funds. When the supervisor
does not monitor, the deposit rates depend negatively on the strength of the local deposit insurance
fund. Moreover, in the case of the subsidiary, the strength of the foreign deposit insurance fund
also matters for the rate at which the home unit can raise money. Weaker foreign deposit insurance
lowers the residual assets available for home depositors from the subsidiary when the home unit fails.
Indeed, R−Pf increases in αf via a reduction in the rate Pf . With a branch-MNB, a deterioration
of αh increases both Ph and Pf as long as the supervisor does not opt for monitoring both units.
Otherwise, rates will be independent of the credibility of the (home) deposit insurance. 25
25In line with this reasoning, Bonfim and Santos (2017) show that some foreign banks operating in Portugal
converted their subsidiaries into branches in 2010 and 2011 when the Portuguese deposit insurance fund became less
credible. Conversely, in 2015 all foreign units of Greek banks were subsidiaries, except for Alpha Bank which had
branches in Romania and Bulgaria. Facing the deterioration of the Greek national deposit insurance, Alpha Bank
faced the largest withdrawal of deposits of all foreign units of Greek banks. Its branches were shortly after acquired
(July 2015) by other Greek banks and reorganized into subsidiaries, backed-up by the more solid Romanian and
Bulgarian national deposit insurance (see “Greek Eurobank Takes Over Alpha Bank’s Branch Network in Bulgaria,”
July 18, 2015, at www.novinite.com).
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The consequences of weak deposit insurance are similar to those of ring-fencing since it also
reduces residual assets, as seen above. The reduction of residual assets due to weak deposit insurance
decreases the magnitude of the intervention effect but it has the same ambiguous consequences on
the monitoring effect: weaker deposit insurance (i.e. lower αf ) diminishes the monitoring effect when
monitoring the home unit is optimal under national supervision, while it accentuates it when not
monitoring the home unit is optimal. Hence, if the MNB’s home unit is not monitored under national
supervision, then weaker deposit insurance makes it more likely that supranational supervision leads
to more monitoring of the subsidiary and the bank would prefer to switch from subsidiary to branch.
If the MNB’s home unit is monitored, then weaker deposit insurance may make it either more or
less likely that supranational supervision leads to more monitoring.
5.3 Failure externalities
A bank’s failure may spur additional costs on the economy. Let ei ≥ 0 be the externality-cost of the
failure of unit i that adds up to the other costs considered so far in that country.26 With a subsidiary
structure the national supervisor in country i would account for ei in the costs of failure, thus making
monitoring unit i more likely than when ei = 0, as was the case in the previous sections. With a
branch structure instead, the home supervisor disregards ef and would then monitor the foreign
unit relatively less than the foreign supervisor of a subsidiary-MNB, thus reinforcing Corollary 1.
A well-conceived supranational supervisory framework should instead internalize these external-
ities. First, the externality ef > 0 makes the supranational supervisor monitor the foreign unit of
a branch-MNB more than the national supervisor. Second, with a subsidiary structure the exter-
nality plays no role because it would be accounted for by the supervisors in any case. Hence, we
can conclude that when failure externalities are present, supranational supervision makes a change
from subsidiaries to branches less likely, and a change from branches to subsidiaries more likely.
5.4 Organizational structure-sensitive insurance premia
As is well known in the theoretical literature, risk-based insurance premia can go a long way towards
alleviating moral hazard in banking (see, e.g., Rochet (1992)). In this model, one needs to go even
further to align incentives with the social optimum: the premia should depend on the organizational
structure of the bank. Indeed, for a given premium, a subsidiary-MNB enjoys an implicit subsidy,
when compared to a branch or a stand-alone: with a certain probability, its foreign creditors are
26Externalities may be more pervasive. For example, the failure of unit i may also induce a cost eij on country j.
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repaid by the foreign deposit insurance fund, even though the home unit redistributes profits to
shareholders.
To see how a premium based on the organizational structure can align the incentives of the
bank with the social optimum, assume that the MNB needs to pay fees Fh(σ) and Ff (σ) up-front
to the deposit insurers of countries h and f , respectively, where σ ∈ {S,B,A} stands for the MNB’s
organizational structure. A fairly priced deposit insurance would imply that the bank pays exactly
the expected costs to each deposit insurer. This is equivalent to having:
Fh(S) = −(1 + λ)Wh(d∗h, d∗f ), Ff (S) = −(1 + λ)Wf (d∗f )
Fh(B) = −(1 + λ)Wb(dbh, dbf ), Ff (B) = 0
Fh(A) = −(1 + λ)Wh(d∗h), Ff (A) = 0.
The same formulas hold under supranational supervision, replacing (d∗h, d
∗




f ). To see
why with such premia the MNB’s organizational structure is socially optimal, observe that the MNB
will for instance choose S over B if and only if Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f )−Fh(S)−Ff (S)−CS ≥ Π(B, dbh, dbf )−
Fh(B)−CB, which is simply equivalent to Π(S, d∗h, d∗f )−CS+(1+λ)Wh(S, d∗h, d∗f )+(1+λ)Wf (d∗f ) ≥
Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )− CB + (1 + λ)Wb(dbh, dbf ): the MNB is in effect maximizing welfare.
While theoretically natural, this solution may be difficult to implement. First, it requires to
have a good understanding of the often complicated structure of the entire MNB, as this structure
has a first-order impact on the distribution of losses in case the MNB defaults. Second, the insur-
ance premium should correctly anticipate and price in the optimal supervisory decisions. To our
knowledge, none of these elements are priced in existing deposit insurance schemes.
Finally, note that this approach does not make supranational supervision redundant, as it still
leads to more monitoring when cf ≥ c∗ and less otherwise. A conclusion from our model is that
making insurance premia depend on the MNB’s structure, while complicated, is necessary to control
the MNB’s incentives to change its organizational structure so as to extract more implicit subsidies
from deposit insurance funds. In particular, our results on welfare (Section 3.3) show that one
cannot simply complement supranational supervision with uniform restrictions on the banks’ foreign
organization. For example, the opening of a new foreign subsidiary can be beneficial and the
conversion of an existing foreign unit into a subsidiary can be detrimental.
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6 Conclusion
We propose a framework to understand the interaction between the architecture of bank supervision
in an international environment and the organizational structure of multinational banks. This
interaction is important to evaluate the impact of recent supervisory reforms aiming at increasing
coordination in supervision, as with the recent European Banking Union and Single Supervisory
Mechanism.
We argue that centralization of bank supervision at a supranational level provides incentives
for MNBs to adjust their foreign activities to the new supervisory arrangement. Accounting for
these incentives has important implications for banks’ profit, supervision costs, deposit insurance
costs, and total welfare. For example, we show that when supranational supervision leads to less
monitoring in foreign subsidiaries, MNBs adjust by converting branches into subsidiaries. Once
this effect is taken into account, supranational supervision ends up increasing the cost of insuring
deposits and reducing welfare.
More broadly, our study shows that reforms of supervision and regulation should not take the
industry structure as given. The strategic reaction of banks can be substantial and, in some cases,
unwind the intended consequences of reforms. We think this is a general message that goes behind
the case of supranational supervision. Other recent or debated reforms, such as forcing subsidiaries
to operate under the common umbrella of a holding company,27 giving more supervisory powers to
host countries,28 introducing a common European deposit insurance, or letting national supervisors
ring-fence local activities of foreign banks, all affect branches and subsidiaries differently and may
also lead MNBs to adjust their structure. While these new policies are worthy of deeper investigation
in future work, we think our analysis and the externalities we have identified are helpful to think
about potential unintended consequences of these reforms.
27In the U.S., since 2014 the Federal Reserve requires large foreign banking organizations with significant presence
in the U.S. to operate their U.S. subsidiaries under an “intermediate holding company” supervised by the Federal
Reserve. Similarly, in 2017 the European Commission announced plans to require non-E.U. subsidiaries to operate
under an “intermediate parent undertaking”.
28The European Banking Authority published guidelines in 2017 giving more powers to host supervisors of
“significant-plus” branches, with a systemic importance for the host country.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in the text for the case of a standalone bank, the foreign supervisor chooses d∗f = O if
cf > c
∗, and d∗f = M otherwise. In particular, note that it is useless for the foreign supervisor to
monitor and not intervene when the assets are bad, so that we don’t need to consider any other
decision than M and O. We consider the home supervisor’s decision in each case.
- Case cf > c
∗: no monitoring in the foreign unit. It is again pointless for the home supervisor
to monitor the home unit and not intervene when the assets are bad. Since the foreign unit is not
monitored, the home supervisor cannot condition his monitoring decision on the quality of assets in
the foreign unit. Hence, we only need to compare the decisions dh = O and dh = M . If the home
unit is not monitored, the home deposit insurance fund will take losses with probability (1−θ)(1−p).
Conditionally on this happening, with probability θ + (1 − θ)p the foreign unit will be profitable
and give some residual assets worth R − 1, otherwise the loss of the home deposit insurance fund
will just be 1. So we have:
Wh(O,O) = (1− θ)(1− p) [−1 + ρ(O)] . (A.1)
If the home unit is monitored, the probability of default is reduced to 0:
Wh(M,O) = −ch. (A.2)
As a result, the home unit in this case will be monitored if and only if ch ≤ (1−θ)(1−p)[1−ρ(O)] =
c∗[1− ρ(O)].
- Case cf ≤ c∗: monitoring in the foreign unit. In addition to the decisions O and M , the home
supervisor can also take a monitoring decision conditionally on foreign assets being bad (decision
C), or conditionally on foreign assets being good (a decision we denote C ′). Similarly to the case
cf > c
∗, we have:
Wh(O,M) = (1− θ)(1− p) [−1 + ρ(M)] (A.3)
Wh(M,M) = −ch. (A.4)
Now consider decision C. With probability 1−θ the foreign unit has bad assets. The home supervisor
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monitors and intervenes when the unit’s assets are bad, reducing the losses to the deposit insurance
funds to zero. With probability θ, the foreign unit has good assets, the home unit is not monitored
and the deposit insurance fund suffers losses of 1 − ρg(M) with probability (1 − θ)(1 − p). This
gives:
Wh(C,M) = θ × (1− θ)(1− p)[−1 + ρg(M)] + (1− θ)× (−ch). (A.5)
Decision C ′ gives a symmetric payoff:
Wh(C
′,M) = θ × (−ch) + (1− θ)× (1− θ)(1− p)[−1 + ρb(M)]. (A.6)
Comparing the different payoffs, we obtain that Wh(C
′,M) ≥ Wh(M,M) if and only if ch ≥
c∗(1−ρb(M)) and Wh(C ′,M) ≥Wh(O,M) if and only if ch ≤ c∗(1−ρg(M)). Since ρg(M) ≥ ρb(M),
the two previous conditions are incompatible and decision C ′ can never be optimal, and we are left
with a comparison of O,M, and C. We have:
Wh(M,M) ≥Wh(C,M) ⇔ ch ≤ c∗(1− ρg(M)) (A.7)
Wh(M,M) ≥Wh(O,M) ⇔ ch ≤ c∗(1− ρ(M)) (A.8)
Wh(C,M) ≥Wh(O,M) ⇔ ch ≤ c∗(1− ρb(M)) (A.9)
Noting that ρg(M) ≥ ρ(M) ≥ ρb(M), the Proposition follows.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As the branch has a symmetric structure and ch ≤ cf , we know that that the foreign unit cannot
be more monitored than the home unit. Thus (dbh, d
b
f ) ∈ {(O,O), (M,O), (M,C), (M,M)}. There
are two additional strategies to consider, but they are never optimal and can thus be ignored, as we
shall show at the end of this proof. Given the liability structure and the fact that R ≤ 2, the deposit
insurance fund suffers losses if and only if at least one unit fails. We first compute the supervisor’s
payoff for each decision pair, and then compare the different payoffs.
Under decision (O,O), each unit fails with probability (1 − θ)(1 − p). If one unit is successful,
the amount R can be used to partially offset the losses. This gives:
Wb(O,O) = [(1− θ)(1− p)]2(−2) + 2(1− θ)(1− p)[θ + (1− θ)p](R− 2)
= 2(1− θ)(1− p)(ρ(O)− 1). (A.10)
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After some simplifications, we thus obtain that Wb(O,O) can be simply rewritten as a function of
the residual assets under decision O, ρ(O).
Under decision (M,O), with probability (1−θ)(1−p) the foreign unit fails. As R < 2, the deposit
insurance fund needs to reimburse 2 to the depositors, and can use on average θR+(1−θ)r of assets
from the home unit to partially offset the losses. With complementary probability θ + (1− θ)p the
foreign unit is successful and the deposit insurance funds incur no losses as r +R > 2. We obtain:
Wb(M,O) = (1− θ)(1− p)[θR+ (1− θ)r − 2]− ch
= (1− θ)(1− p)[ρ(M)− 1]− ch. (A.11)
Under decision (M,C), the foreign unit is monitored only if the home unit has bad assets. With
probability θ, the home unit has good assets, in which case the deposit insurance fund loses money
only if the foreign unit defaults, which happens with probability (1 − θ)(1 − p). With probability
(1− θ) the home unit has bad assets, the foreign unit is monitored and bad units are restructured,
reducing the losses to the deposit insurance to zero. This gives us:
Wb(M,C) = θ(1− θ)(1− p)(R− 2)− ch − (1− θ)cf .
Finally, consider decision (M,M). The home supervisor incurs the monitoring costs for both units.
However, monitoring enables the supervisor to restructure failing units and reduce the losses to the
deposit insurance funds to zero. We obtain:
Wb(M,M) = −ch − cf .
We can now compare the different payoffs. Using r = pR, we have ρ(O) = ρ(M) + (1 − θ)(1 − p)
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and ρb(O) = ρb(M) + 1− p. Using these equalities, we can derive the following equivalences:
Wb(M,M) ≥Wb(M,C) ⇔ cf ≤ c∗[1− ρg(M)] (A.12)
Wb(M,M) ≥Wb(M,O) ⇔ cf ≤ c∗[1− ρ(M)] (A.13)
Wb(M,M) ≥Wb(O,O) ⇔ cf + ch ≤ 2c∗[1− ρ(O)] (A.14)
Wb(M,C) ≥Wb(M,O) ⇔ cf ≤ c∗[1− ρb(M)] (A.15)
Wb(M,C) ≥Wb(O,O) ⇔ ch + (1− θ)cf ≤ c∗[1− ρ(O)]
+(1− θ)c∗[1− ρb(O))] (A.16)
Wb(M,O) ≥Wb(O,O) ⇔ ch ≤ c∗[1− (1− θ)(1− p)− ρ(O)]. (A.17)
Observe that in order for (M,C) to be optimal we need c∗[1 − ρg(M)] ≤ c∗[1 − ρb(M)] (equations
(A.12) and (A.15)), which is equivalent to (2 − r) ≥ 2 − R, which is true as r < R. Thus, (A.13)
is implied by (A.12), so that (M,M) obtains when (A.12) and (A.14) are satisfied. (M,C) obtains
when (A.15) and (A.16) are satisfied and (A.12) is not. For (M,O), if Wb(M,O) ≥Wb(M,C) then
Wb(M,O) ≥ Wb(M,M), so that (M,O) obtains if and only if (A.17) is satisfied and not (A.15)).
(O,O) obtains otherwise.
To conclude the proof, we need to exclude two additional possible decisions, which we do in the
Online Appendix B.1.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
We first consider the case ch ≤ cf .
Point (i): If d∗f = O then according to Proposition 1 cf ≥ c∗. According to inequalities (A.12)
and (A.15) in the proof of Proposition 2, this implies that (dbh, d
b
f ) can be neither (M,M) nor
(M,C), so that necessarily dbf = O.
Point (ii): Using again Propositions 1 and 2, we need to show that cf > c
∗ and ch > c
∗(1−ρ(O))
imply that (A.14), (A.16), and (A.17) are violated.
This is obvious for (A.17), since c∗[1 − ρ(O)] > c∗[1 − (1 − θ)(1 − p) − ρ(O)]. For (A.16) it is
sufficient to show that c∗[1−ρ(O)]+(1−θ)c∗ > [1−ρ(O)]c∗+(1−θ)[1−ρb(O)]c∗, which is obviously
true. Finally, for (A.14) one needs to show that c∗(2− ρ(O)) ≥ 2c∗[1− ρ(O)], which is true.
In the case ch > cf we can prove a stronger result: if d
∗




f ) = (O,O). Since
d∗f = O we have cf ≥ c∗, so that ch > c∗. This, together with the conditions equivalent to (A.12)-
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(A.16) for the case ch > cf (thus inverting the indexes in those expressions), imply that the only
possible decisions with branch-MNB are (O,O), (O,M). However, (O,M) is impossible because
the equivalent of condition (A.17) is incompatible with cf ≥ c∗.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1




h 6= d∗∗h . The supranational
supervisor chooses a pair of decisions. In particular, since the pair (d∗∗h , d
∗∗





f ) +Wf (d
∗∗
f ) ≥Wh(d∗h, d∗∗f ) +Wf (d∗∗f ), (A.18)
but since d∗h is optimal for the home supervisor in the national case, it must be a best response to
d∗f = d
∗∗





f ) ≥Wh(d∗∗h , d∗∗f ). (A.19)
Both inequalities cannot hold unless d∗h = d
∗∗
h , a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1 allows us to focus on identifying cases in which supranational supervision leads to a
different decision in the foreign unit. For the moment we focus only on strategy pairs that can
be obtained under national supervision, and postpone the other cases to the end of this proof.
Denoting (d∗h, d
∗
f )→ (d∗∗h , d∗∗f ) the case in which national supervision leads to decisions (d∗h, d∗f ) and
supranational supervision to (d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f ), we have 12 possible cases: 1. (O,O)→ (O,M); 2. (O,O)→
(M,M); 3. (O,O) → (C,M); 4. (M,O) → (O,M); 5. (M,O) → (M,M); 6. (M,O) → (C,M);
7. (O,M) → (O,O); 8. (O,M) → (M,O); 9. (M,M) → (O,O); 10. (M,M) → (M,O); 11.
(C,M)→ (O,O); 12. (C,M)→ (M,O).
We can simplify further, using the two effects we have defined and the ranking of residual assets.
First, let us prove that if d∗f = O and d
∗∗
f = M then d
∗∗
h = C, so that we can eliminate cases 1, 2,
4, and 5. By contradiction, assume this is not the case. By definition, we have Wf (O) ≥Wf (M) due
to the optimality of O for the foreign supervisor. Since (d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f ) is optimal for the supranational
supervisor, we also have Wh(d
∗∗
h ,M) +Wf (M) ≥Wh(d∗h, O) +Wf (O). These two inequalities imply
that we must have Wh(d
∗∗
h ,M) ≥ Wh(d∗h, O), which is equivalent to ηI ≥ 0. This is never true,
hence a contradiction. Intuitively, the supranational supervisor changes the decision in the foreign
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unit from O to M only if this implies a positive monitoring effect, as otherwise this change only
implies a negative intervention effect.
Second, let us prove that we can eliminate cases 8 and 9. For case 8 to be possible we need
Wh(O,M) ≥ Wh(M,M) and Wh(M,O) ≥ Wh(O,O), which is equivalent to ch ≥ c∗[1 − ρ(M)]
and ch ≤ c∗[1 − ρ(O)]. These two conditions are not compatible, as ρ(O) > ρ(M). Similarly,
for case 9 we need Wh(M,M) ≥ Wh(C,M) and Wh(O,O) ≥ Wh(M,O), which is equivalent to
ch ≤ c∗(1− ρg(M)) and ch ≥ c∗(1− ρ(O)), which is again impossible as ρg(M) > ρ(O).
We are thus left with six cases. We focus on the four cases that can be obtained in equilibrium,
we show in the Online Appendix B.2 that the other two cases never obtain. The Online Appendix
also shows that the decisions df ∈ {C,C ′,M ′} can never be optimal for the supranational supervisor.
- Case 3: (O,O) → (C,M). We need to show under which conditions (C,M) is optimal for
the supranational supervisor, knowing that (d∗h, d
∗
f ) = (O,O). First, we know that (M,O) is
necessarily dominated by (O,O) for the supranational supervisor, as (d∗h, d
∗
f ) = (O,O) implies that
Wh(O,O) ≥ Wh(M,O). Second, from the reasoning above excluding cases 1, 2, 4, and 5, we know
that the total welfare cannot be higher with (O,M) and (M,M) than with (O,O). There are thus
only two possibilities: either the supranational supervisor chooses (C,M), or she chooses (O,O).
Thus, we just need to compare the payoff with both decision pairs, which gives:
Wh(C,M) +Wf (M) ≥Wh(O,O) +Wf (O).
Note that Wf (O)−Wf (M) = cf − c∗, which is positive because in order to have (d∗h, d∗f ) = (O,O)
we need cf ≥ c∗. So it is necessary to have Wh(C,M) ≥ Wh(O,O), in which case we have SE =
Wh(C,M)−Wh(O,O). To conclude, this case obtains if and only if ch ≥ c∗(1−ρ(O)), cf ≥ c∗, and
cf ≤ SE + c∗. This defines a non-empty set of parameters, as shown on Fig. 3.
- Case 6: (M,O)→ (C,M). The reasoning is exactly the same, except that we need (C,M) to
be preferred to (M,O):
Wh(C,M) +Wf (M) ≥Wh(M,O) +Wf (O).
As in Case 3, this is possible only if Wh(C,M) ≥ Wh(M,O), in which case we have SE =
Wh(C,M) −Wh(M,O), so that this case obtains if and only if ch ≤ c∗(1 − ρ(O)), cf ≥ c∗, and
cf ≤ SE + c∗. This set of parameters is non-empty, as shown on Fig. 3.
- Case 7: (O,M)→ (O,O). We need to show under which conditions (O,O) is optimal for the
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supranational supervisor, knowing that (d∗h, d
∗
f ) = (O,M). Decision pairs (C,M) and (M,M) are
dominated by (O,M). Thus, we only need to check that the supranational supervisor prefers (O,O)
to (O,M) and to (M,O). Since d∗h = O we have Wh(O,M) ≥Wh(C,M) so that ch ≥ c∗(1−ρb(M)),
which implies ch ≥ c∗(1 − ρ(O)) and thus Wh(O,O) ≥ Wh(M,O). Hence, the supranational
supervisor necessarily prefers (O,O) to (M,O). The last thing to check is that (O,O) is preferred
to (O,M):
Wh(O,O) +Wf (O) ≥Wh(O,M) +Wf (M).
Since Wh(C,M) ≤ Wh(O,M), we have ηM = 0 and SE = Wh(O,M)−Wh(O,O). Thus, this case
obtains if and only if ch ≥ c∗(1− ρ(O)), cf ≤ c∗, and SE ≤ cf − c∗. In particular, these inequalities
imply that SE ≤ 0. This set of parameters is non-empty, as shown on Fig. 3.
- Case 11: (C,M)→ (O,O). Decisions pairs (O,M) and (M,M) are dominated by (C,M), so
that we only need to check that (O,O) dominates (C,M) and (M,O). (O,O) dominates (M,O) if
and only if ch ≥ c∗(1− ρ(O)), and (O,O) dominates (C,M) if and only if:
Wh(O,O) +Wf (O) ≥Wh(C,M) +Wf (M)
As d∗h = C we have SE = Wh(C,M)−Wh(O,O) so that this condition is equivalent to SE ≤ cf−c∗.
Thus, this case obtains if and only if ch ∈ (c∗[1−ρg(M)], c∗[1−ρb(M)]], cf ≤ c∗, and SE ≤ cf − c∗.
In particular, these inequalities imply that SE ≤ 0. This set of parameters is non-empty, as shown
on Fig. 3.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 2
Using Proposition 3, to prove the Corollary it is sufficient to show that the MNB’s profits for
different supervisory decisions can be ranked as follows:
Π(S,C,M) < Π(S,O,M) < Π(S,M,O) < Π(S,O,O). (A.20)
In general, the MNB will obtain a positive profit if and only if the home unit is successful. The
profit is then equal to the value of residual assets in the home unit, plus the value of residual assets
in the foreign unit.
Since in all cases except (C,M) the payoff from the home unit is independent from what happens
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in the foreign unit, we easily obtain:
Π(S,O,M) = ρ(O) + [θ + (1− θ)p]ρ(M) (A.21)
Π(S,M,O) = ρ(M) + ρ(O) (A.22)
Π(S,O,O) = ρ(O) + [θ + (1− θ)p]ρ(O). (A.23)
The case (C,M) is more complicated, as now the payoff from the home unit depends on what
happens in the foreign unit. With probability θ, the foreign unit has good assets, and the home
unit is not monitored. Then the value of residual assets in the home unit is ρ(O), and in addition
the MNB obtains a payoff ρg(M) from the foreign unit if the home unit is successful, which happens
with probability [θ+ (1−θ)p]. With probability 1−θ, the foreign unit has bad assets and the home
unit is monitored. The value of residual assets in the home unit is ρ(M), the MNB makes a positive
profit with probability 1, and obtains an expected ρb(M) from the foreign unit. Summing up:
Π(S,C,M) = θρ(O) + (1− θ)ρ(M) + θ[θ + (1− θ)p]ρg(M) + (1− θ)ρb(M)
= θρ(O) + (1− θ)ρ(M) + [θ + (1− θ)p]ρ(M) + (1− θ)2(1− p)ρb(M). (A.24)
We can now compare these different quantities. Recalling that ρ(M) = θρg(M) + (1− θ)ρb(M) and
ρ(O)− ρ(M) = c∗, we have:
Π(S,O,M) > Π(S,C,M) ⇔ (1− θ)(ρ(O)− ρ(M))− (1− θ)2(1− p)ρb(M) > 0
⇔ (1− θ)c∗(1− ρb(M)) > 0 (A.25)
Π(S,M,O) > Π(S,O,M) ⇔ (1− θ)(1− p)ρ(M) > 0 (A.26)
Π(S,O,O) > Π(S,M,O) ⇔ ρ(O)− ρ(M) +−(1− θ)(1− p)ρ(O) > 0
⇔ c∗(1− ρ(O)) > 0, (A.27)
which shows the desired inequalities and concludes the proof.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Case (i): Supranational supervision leads to a switch from a subsidiary structure to a branch
structure if and only if:
Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f )− CS ≥ Π(B, dbh, dbf )− CB (A.28)
Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f )− CS ≥ Π(A, dah) (A.29)
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )− CS ≤ Π(B, dbh, dbf )− CB (A.30)
Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )− CB ≥ Π(A, dah). (A.31)
From (A.28) and (A.30) we deduce that we necessarily have Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f ) ≥ Π(S, d∗∗h , d∗∗f ). Ac-
cording to Corollary 2, this is possible only if cf > c
∗. Then, to satisfy all the four inequalities
simultaneously, one can for instance pick CS and CB such that:
CS = Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )−Π(A, dah) (A.32)
CB = Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )−Π(A, dah) +
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )−Π(S, d∗h, d∗f )
2
. (A.33)
Similarly, for a switch from a subsidiary structure to a stand-alone bank we will need (A.29) and
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )− CS ≤ Π(A, dah), which implies again Π(S, d∗h, d∗f ) ≥ Π(S, d∗∗h , d∗∗f ) and thus cf > c∗.
One can again easily build values of CS and CB such that this case obtains.
Case (ii): Supranational supervision leads to a switch from a branch structure to a subsidiary
structure if and only if:
Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )− CB ≥ Π(S, d∗h, d∗f )− CS (A.34)
Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )− CB ≥ Π(A, dah). (A.35)
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )− CS ≥ Π(B, dbh, dbf )− CB (A.36)
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗
f )− CS ≥ Π(A, dah). (A.37)
Combining (A.34) and (A.36) gives Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗




f ), which using Corollary 2 is possible
only if cf ≤ c∗. Then, to satisfy all the four inequalities simultaneously, one can for instance pick
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CS and CB such that:
CB = Π(B, dbh, d
b
f )−Π(A, dah) (A.38)
CS =
Π(S, d∗∗h , d
∗∗







Similarly, for a switch from a stand-alone bank to a subsidiary structure we will need (A.37) and
Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f ) − CS ≤ Π(A, dah), which implies Π(S, d∗h, d∗f ) ≤ Π(S, d∗∗h , d∗∗f ) and thus cf ≤ c∗. One
can again easily build values of CS and CB such that this case obtains.
A.8 Proof of Corollaries 3, 4, 5, and 6
The proofs of Corollaries 3, 4, and 5 are in the Online Appendix B.3, B.4, and B.5, respectively.
Corollary 6 is proven in the main text.
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B.1 End of the proof of Proposition 2
First, consider again decision C ′, which can only be combined with decision M . Since ch ≤ cf , the
only relevant decision pair to consider is (M,C ′).
Wb(M,C
′) = (1− θ)(1− θ)(1− p)(r − 2)
−ch − θcf (B.1)
In order for Wb(M,C
′) to be optimal, it should give a higher payoff than Wb(M,O) and Wb(M,O).
These conditions boil down to:
c∗(1− ρb(M)) ≤ cf ≤ c∗(1− ρg(M))
However, as ρb(M) < ρg(M), we reach a contradiction. Wb(M,C
′) will always be dominated either
by decisions (M,O) or by (M,M).
Second, consider a new decision M ′: the branch supervisor monitors the home unit, does not
intervene when the assets are bad, but uses this information to monitor the foreign unit. The
strategy pair (M ′, C) thus allows to monitor the foreign unit only when it is most useful, but
without reducing the value of the home unit’s assets. Wb(M
′, C) can be computed by replacing in
the expression of Wb(M,C):
Wb(M
′, C) = θ(1− θ)(1− p)(R− 2) + (1− θ)(1− p)(θR+ (1− θ)r − 2) +
−ch − (1− θ)cf (B.2)
With simple calculations we obtain
Wb(M,O)−Wb(M ′, C) = (1− p)(2−R)(1− θ)θ + (1− θ)cf ≥ 0
i
and decisions (M ′, C) can never be optimal.
Finally, decisions (M ′, C ′) are dominated by (M ′, C) because, if anything, dh = M
′ is meant to
monitor the foreign unit when it is most useful, so that df = C would be better than df = C
′.
B.2 End of the proof of Proposition 3
To conclude the proof, we need to show that cases 10 and 11 can never obtain, and that the strategies
df ∈ {C,C ′,M ′} cannot be optimal under supranational supervision.
- Case 10: (M,M)→ (M,O). This case is impossible. We need (M,O) to dominate (M,M) for
the supranational supervisor, which writes:
Wh(M,O) +Wf (O) ≥Wh(M,M) +Wf (M).
Since Wh(M,O) = Wh(M,M) = −ch, we need Wf (O) ≥ Wf (M), which contradicts the fact that
d∗f = M , so that this case cannot obtain.
- Case 12: (C,M)→ (M,O). This case is impossible. We need to check that (M,O) dominates
(C,M), which gives:
Wh(M,O) +Wf (O) ≥Wh(C,M) +Wf (M).
As d∗f = M , we have Wf (M) ≥Wf (O) so we need Wh(M,O) ≥Wh(C,M). However, since d∗h = C
we have Wh(C,M) ≥Wh(M,M) = Wh(M,O), so this case cannot obtain.
We can now consider the additional strategies df ∈ {C,C ′,M ′}, which cannot obtain under
national supervision. Note that due to Lemma 1 we only need to show that the supranational
supervisor never uses these strategies in the foreign unit. In particular, the Lemma ensures that if
df ∈ {M,O} then dh ∈ {C ′,M ′} cannot be optimal for the supranational supervisor.
- df = C is not optimal: it is easy to show that (M,C) dominates (M
′, C), so we focus on the
former. We have:
Wh(M,C) = −ch (B.3)
Wf (C) = θWf (O) + (1− θ)Wf (M). (B.4)
Note that Wh(M,C) = Wh(M,M), so that (M,C) dominates (M,M) if and only if Wh(M,C) +
Wf (C) ≥ Wh(M,M) + Wf (M), which is equivalent to Wf (O) ≥ Wf (M). However, if this is the
case we also have Wh(M,O) + Wf (O) ≥ Wh(M,C) + Wf (C), because Wh(M,O) ≥ Wh(M,C) =
ii
Wh(M,M) and Wf (O) ≥ Wf (M) ⇒ Wf (O) ≥ Wf (C). Thus, (M,C) is necessarily dominated
either by (M,M) or by (M,O), and df = C can never be optimal.
- df = M
′ is not optimal: the only point of choosing M ′ rather than O is to have dh = C, so we
consider the pair (C,M ′). We have Wf (M
′) = Wf (O)− cf and:
Wh(C,M
′) = θ[(1− θ)(1− p)[−1 + ρg(O)]]− (1− θ)ch. (B.5)
For (C,M ′) to be optimal we need in particular Wh(C,M
′)+Wf (M
′) ≥Wh(C,M)+Wf (M), which
gives:
θ(1− θ)(1− p)[ρg(O)− ρg(M)] ≥Wf (M)−Wf (O) + cf . (B.6)
Since ρg(O) = ρg(M), we need Wf (O)−Wf (M) ≥ cf , which is false since wf (O)−Wf (M) = cf−c∗.
Hence, (C,M ′) is always dominated by (C,M) and df = M
′ can never be optimal.
- df = C
′ is not optimal: This decision makes sense only if the supranational supervisor chooses
(M,C ′), in which case we have:
Wf (C
′) = θWf (M) + (1− θ)Wf (O) (B.7)
Wh(M,C
′) = −ch. (B.8)
Since Wh(M,C
′) = Wh(M,O) = Wh(M,M), it is clear that we cannot simultaneously have
Wh(M,C
′) + Wf (C
′) > Wh(M,M) + Wf (M) and Wh(M,C
′) + Wf (C
′) > Wh(M,O) + Wf (O).
Hence, (M,C ′) is always dominated by another strategy, and df = C
′ cannot be optimal.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Case (i). We know from Proposition 3 that supranational supervision leads to more monitoring,
and this decreases the MNB’s profit (Corollary 2). Since the supranational supervisor maximizes
the joint payoffs to the national supervisors and deposit insurance funds, the total payoff increases
by definition.
The last point to study is total welfare. Obviously for a large enough λ the decrease in total
public costs will dominate the decrease in the MNB’s profits, and total welfare will increase. Con-
versely, if λ = 0 then total welfare is simply the total value of the MNB’s assets minus the MNB’s
operating costs, minus supervision costs. The total value of the assets in unit i is [θ+ (1− θ)p]R if
di = O, θR+(1−θ)r if di = M , and θ[θ+(1−θ)p]R+(1−θ)[θR+(1−θ)r] if di = C. Since r = pR,
iii
these three quantities are equal: monitoring keeps the total value of the assets unchanged. Thus,
when λ = 0 the only impact of supranational supervision is an increase in monitoring costs, which
reduces total welfare. Thus, there exists a positive level λ̄1 > 0 such that supranational supervision
increases welfare if and only if λ ≥ λ̄1.
Case (ii). Now supranational supervision leads to less monitoring, which increases the MNB’s
profit. However, it is still the case that supranational supervision necessarily decreases the total
public costs, for the same reason as in case (i). Since now supranational supervision benefits both
the MNB and the public sector, total welfare necessarily increases, for any value of λ.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 4
Case (i). If the MNB changes its structure from subsidiary to branch, we necessarily have Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f )−
CS ≥ Π(B, dbh, dbf ) − CB, because otherwise the MNB would have preferred the branch structure
under national supervision. So the MNB’s profit decreases. For the impact on total public costs,
note that with a branch structure the home supervisor can always replicate the decisions of the sub-
sidiary under national supervision and choose (dbh, d
b




f ). By doing so, the total monitoring
costs are the same as under national supervision, but the total losses to the deposit insurance are
lower given the liability structure of the branch. The sum of the losses to the deposit insurance funds
and monitoring costs is thus lower in the branch case when (dbh, d
b




f ), and a fortiori for the
optimal supervisory decisions of the branch supervisor. This shows that supranational supervision,
by inducing a switch from subsidiary to branch, lower the total public costs.
Finally, we analyze total welfare. Consider the case in which λ = 0, and CB = CS . As
argued in the proof of Corollary 4, in this case the only part of total welfare that is affected by
supervisory decisions is monitoring costs. As shown in Corollary 1, the branch is less monitored
than the subsidiary under national supervision, so that monitoring costs decrease after the switch
to a branch structure. Thus, total welfare necessarily increases with supranational supervision. If
λ > 0, we are just putting more weight on the public costs, which are reduced by supranational
supervision, and less on the MNB’s profit. So the impact on total welfare is a fortiori positive. If
CB ≤ CS , the switch to a branch also reduces operating costs, so that again the impact on total
welfare is necessarily positive.
Case (ii). Recall that the branch is unaffected by supranational supervision, so if the MNB





f ) − CB. Thus, the MNB’s profit increases. For the impact on total public costs, note
iv
that there is no externality in the branch case (only one supervisor), so the supranational supervisor
would take exactly the same decision in the branch as the home supervisor. However, for any given
decision the total public costs are larger with a subsidiary than with a branch, so necessarily total
public costs increase with the switch from branch under national supervision to subsidiary under
supranational supervision.
For total welfare, again in the case λ = 0 and CB = CS it is clear that total welfare decreases
under supranational supervision due to larger monitoring costs. This is a fortiori true if λ > 0
because we put more weight on the public sector, which is negatively affected by supranational
supervision, and if CB ≤ CS , because the MNB chooses a structure with higher operating costs.
B.5 Proof of Corollary 5
The reasoning is similar to the proof of Corollary 4.
Case (i). It is clear that when the MNB shuts down its foreign unit the MNB’s profit decreases,
Π(S, d∗h, d
∗
f )− CS ≥ Π(A, dah) ≥ max{Π(S, d∗∗h , d∗∗f )− CS ,Π(B, dbh, dbf )− CB},
otherwise the MNB would not have opened the foreign unit under national supervision. Consider
the total public costs. Under Case (i) we have d∗f = O, so that d
∗
h ∈ {M,O}. If d∗h = M , then after
the switch to stand-alone we necessarily have dah = M as well (because the loss of foreign residual
assets reinforces the incentives to monitor the home unit). Hence, the total monitoring costs are
equal to ch in both cases. The total losses to the deposit insurance funds are equal to (1− θ)(1− p)
under national supervision (subsidiary) and to 0 under supranational supervision (stand-alone).
Hence, total public costs are lower under supranational supervision. If d∗h = O instead, since the
supranational supervisor chooses dah so as to minimize total public costs, these public costs are lower




h = O the monitoring costs are not
affected by supranational supervision, and total losses to the deposit insurance funds decrease from
(1 − θ)(1 − p) + (1 − θ)(1 − p)[1 − ρ(O)] to (1 − θ)(1 − p). In all cases, supranational supervision
thus reduces total public costs.
Because of this last result, supranational supervision necessarily increases total welfare if λ is
large enough. When λ = 0 instead, we only need to consider the total value of the MNB’s assets
and the monitoring costs and the organizational cost CS .The switch to a stand-alone reduces the
total value of the MNB’s assets due to (H1). Monitoring costs in the foreign unit do not decrease
v
because Case (i) implies that d∗f = O, and monitoring costs in the home unit do not decrease either,
since the stand-alone cannot be less monitored than the home unit of a subsidiary. Hence, total
welfare necessarily decreases when λ = 0. Given that total welfare is linear in λ, there exists a value
λ̄2 as described in the Corollary.
Case (ii). The reasoning is entirely symmetric.
vi
